





Is lumpy investment really irrelevant for the business cycle?
by
Tommy Sveen and Lutz WeinkeISSN 0801-2504 (printed) 1502-8143 (online)
ISBN 82-7553-305-8 (printed), 82-7553-306-6 (online)
Working papers from Norges Bank can be ordered by e-mail:
posten@norges-bank.no
or from Norges Bank, Subscription service,
P.O.Box. 1179 Sentrum 
N-0107Oslo, Norway.
Tel. +47 22 31 63 83, Fax. +47 22 41 31 05
Working papers from 1999 onwards are available as pdf-files on the bank’s
web site: www.norges-bank.no, under “Publications”.
Norges Bank’s working papers present
research projects and reports
(not usually in their final form)
and are intended inter alia to enable
the author to benefit from the comments
of colleagues and other interested parties.
Views and conclusions expressed in working papers are 
the responsibility of the authors alone.
Working papers fra Norges Bank kan bestilles over e-post:
posten@norges-bank.no




Telefon 22 31 63 83, Telefaks 22 41 31 05
Fra 1999 og senere er publikasjonene tilgjengelige som pdf-filer 
på www.norges-bank.no, under “Publikasjoner”.
Working papers inneholder forskningsarbeider 
og utredninger som vanligvis
ikke har fått sin endelige form. 
Hensikten er blant annet at forfatteren 
kan motta kommentarer fra kolleger 
og andre interesserte.
Synspunkter og konklusjoner i arbeidene 








New-Keynesian (NK) models can only account for the dynamic eﬀects
of monetary policy shocks if it is assumed that aggregate capital accumula-
tion is much smoother than it would be the case under frictionless ﬁrm-level
investment, as discussed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). We ﬁnd that lumpy
investment, when combined with price stickiness and market power of ﬁrms,
can rationalize this assumption. Our main result is in stark contrast with the
conclusions obtained by Thomas (2002) in the context of a real business cycle
(RBC) model. We use our model to explain the economic mechanism behind
this diﬀerence in the predictions of RBC and NK theory.
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11 Introduction
What are the consequences of lumpy ﬁrm-level investment for business cycle dy-
namics? This question has been studied by Thomas (2002) in the context of a real
business cycle model with perfect competition and fully ﬂexible prices. Her analysis
implies that the equilibrium dynamics with lumpy ﬁrm-level investment are strik-
ingly similar to the ones associated with a speciﬁc a t i o nw h e r ei n v e s t m e n ta tt h eﬁrm
level is frictionless.1
In the present paper we seek to understand the role of lumpy ﬁrm-level invest-
ment in a dynamic New Keynesian (NK) model. This is important because if the
above mentioned result by Thomas (2002) were robust in the context of NK models
then this would cast serious doubts on the extent to which these models are useful
for the analysis of the consequences of monetary policy, which is the hallmark of
NK theory. The reason is that NK models featuring frictionless endogenous cap-
ital accumulation cannot explain the consequences of monetary policy shocks, as
Casares and McCallum (2000) and Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) have shown. In order
to render NK models capable of avoiding this problem it is common practice to
assume some convex capital adjustment cost.2 This is clearly unrealistic in the light
of the microevidence on investment behavior. More importantly, it is unclear if the
smoothness in aggregate capital accumulation, which is needed to render NK models
consistent with the empirical evidence on monetary policy shocks, can be obtained
with lumpy ﬁrm-level investment.
We ﬁnd that our NK model with lumpy ﬁrm-level investment is equivalent to an
otherwise identical speciﬁcation featuring a convex capital adjustment cost at the
ﬁrm level. This is due to the presence of price stickiness and imperfect competition
1This result is robust with respect to the inclusion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks at the
ﬁrm-level, as has been recently shown in Khan and Thomas (2005). A similar quasi-irrelevance
result has also been obtained in Veracierto (2002). However, the focus of his analysis is the role of
ﬁrm-level irreversibility in investment for aggregate ﬂuctuations.
2See, e.g., Christiano et al.(2005), Smets and Wouters (2003), and Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).
2in goods markets. Our main ﬁnding is that aggregate smoothness in capital accumu-
lation is increasing with both the degrees of price stickiness in the economy and the
market power of ﬁrms. Let us put this result into perspective. Thomas (2002) notes
that if prices are ﬁxed then “there are both quantitative and qualitative changes in
the response of aggregate investment relative to the neoclassical benchmark”. This
way she conﬁrms earlier results which have been obtained in the context of partial
equilibrium models.3 Our main contribution in the present paper is therefore the
following. We explain the eﬀects of an empirically plausible degree of price stickiness
in goods markets on aggregate capital accumulation, and we disentangle this from
the consequences of imperfect competition, which we identify as an independent
factor underlying the aggregate relevance of lumpy ﬁrm-level investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines our baseline
model with lumpy ﬁrm-level investment. We employ the Calvo mechanism both for
modeling price stickiness, as it is the standard in a large body of literature, and for
modeling lumpiness in investment, as has been originally proposed by Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). In Section 3 we present and discuss our results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model economy
In this section we establish the equivalence between a NK model with lumpy invest-
ment and an alternative speciﬁcation featuring a convex capital adjustment cost at
the ﬁrm level.4 This equivalence holds for any source of aggregate uncertainty and
regardless of the particular rule assumed for the conduct of monetary policy. We
3See, e.g., Caballero and Engle (1999) and Caballero (1999).
4Assuming a convex capital adjustment cost at the ﬁrm level in a model with staggered price
setting has been originally proposed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). Recently, other contributions that
use this set of assumptions have mushroomed. See, e.g., Altig. et al. (2004), Christiano (2004),
Sveen and Weinke (2004, 2005), and Woodford (2004, 2005), among many others. One corollary
of the equivalence result in the present paper is that the conclusions obtained in this strand of the
literature do not appear to hinge on empirically unappealing assumptions regarding investment
behavior on the part of ﬁrms.
3therefore leave these two aspects of our model unspeciﬁed and focus on the behavior
of ﬁrms and households. Firms are assumed to act under monopolistic competition.
The features of sticky prices and lumpy investments are introduced into the model
by invoking the Calvo (1983) assumption both for price setting- and for investment
decisions, i.e. we assume two exogenous adjustment probabilities, one for each de-
cision. This way we capture the fact that ﬁrms change prices or adjust their capital
stocks only infrequently. Households are modelled in a standard way. We turn to
this next.
2.1 Households
Households have access to a complete set of ﬁnancial securities and supply labor






kU (Ct+j,N t+j), (1)
where U (·) is period utility, Ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz composite consumption index, and












where parameters σ and φ are, respectively, the inverse of the household’s intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution and the inverse of the household’s labour supply
elasticity.









for i ∈ [0,1], (3)
where parameter ε>1 measures the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent
4types of goods.
The household’s maximization is subject to a sequence of budget constraints
which take the following form:
Z
[Pt (i)Ct (i)]di + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Dt + PtWtNt + Tt. (4)
Here Pt (i) is the price of type i goods, Qt,t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor
for random nominal payments, Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ associated with the port-
folio held at the end of period t,a n dTt denotes proﬁts resulting from ownership of
ﬁrms.
Optimizing behavior on the part of households implies the following consumption


































t = EtQt,t+1 is the price of a risk-less one-period bond. The ﬁrst equation
is the labor supply equation, whereas the second one is a standard intertemporal
optimality condition.
52.2 Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms indexed on the unit interval. Each ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1] is





where α ∈ [0,1] is the capital share. The variables Nt (i) and Kt (i) denote, respec-
tively, hours used and capital holdings of ﬁrm i in period t.
Cost minimization by ﬁrms and households implies that demand for each indi-












t denotes aggregate demand at time t,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
Y
d
t = Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt, (11)
and Kt ≡
R 1
0 Kt (i)di deﬁnes aggregate capital holdings.
Each period a measure 1−θp of randomly selected ﬁrms change their prices and
the rest of the ﬁrms keep their prices constant. We model lumpy investment in
an analog way. In order to capture the fact that ﬁrms adjust their capital stocks
infrequently we assume that each of them invests in a certain time period with
probability 1 − θk. The adjustment probability is independent of the time elapsed
since the last investment and of whether the ﬁrm is allowed to change its price or
not. The latter assumption is used to capture the fact that the economic reasons
giving rise to infrequent adjustment of prices and capital holdings are likely to be
diﬀerent from each other. Moreover, to simplify the analysis, we assume that the
investment lottery is drawn after the price-setting lottery. Hence, ﬁrms have to post
6their prices before they get to know the outcome of the investment lottery.
Let us consider a price setter’s problem. Given its time t capital stock, Kt (i),a







































t+j+1(i) with prob. (1 − θp)






t+j+1(i) with prob. (1 − θk)
Kt+j(i) with prob. θk
The last restriction reﬂects our assumption regarding the timing of the two lotteries
for price setting and for investment. Moreover, it is implicit in this formulation
that a ﬁrm which is not allowed to make an investment decision in a given period
is nevertheless assumed to keep its capital constant by paying for the depreciation.
This way we capture the fact that ﬁrms appear to engage continuously in some small
maintenance investment, as Doms and Dunne (1998) report for the U.S. economy.











t (i) − µPt+jMCt+j (i)]
ª
=0 , (12)
5A ﬁrm j that cannot change its price at time t solves the same problem, except for the fact
that it takes Pt(j) as given.
7where µ ≡ ε
ε−1 denotes the frictionless mark-up over marginal costs, and MCt (i)





where MPLt (i) denotes the marginal product of labour of ﬁrm i in period t.E q u a -
tion (12) reﬂects that prices are chosen in a forward-looking manner, i.e. taking into
account not only the current but also the future marginal cost over the expected
lifetime of a chosen price.





kEt {Qt,t+j [Pt+j − Qt+j,t+j+1Pt+j+1 (MSt+j+1 (i)+( 1− δ))]} =0 (14)
where MSt+1(i) denotes the reduction in ﬁrm i’s real labor cost associated with hav-






where MPKt (i) denotes the marginal product of capital of ﬁrm i in period t.E q u a -
tion (14) shows that ﬁr m si n v e s ti naf o r w a r d - l o o k i n gm a n n e r ,i . e .t a k i n gi n t oa c -
count not only the current but also the future marginal return to capital over the
expected lifetime of a chosen capital stock.
2.3 Market Clearing
Clearing of the labor market requires that hours worked, Nt,a r eg i v e nb yt h ef o l -









2.4 Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
We restrict attention to a linear approximation around a zero inﬂation steady state.
In what follows lower case letters denote the log deviation of the original variable
from its steady state value.
2.4.1 Households
From the household’s problem we obtain, respectively, an Euler equation and a labor
supply equation. They read:
ct = Etct+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 − ρ), (18)
wt = φnt + σct, (19)
where parameter ρ ≡−logβ is the time discount rate, it ≡ logRt denotes the time





is time t inﬂation.
2.4.2 Firms
We follow Woodford (2004) and derive both the law of motion of aggregate capital
and the inﬂation equation by employing the method of undetermined coeﬃcients.
They are given by:
∆kt+1 = βEt∆kt+2 +
1
ηl
{(1 − β (1 − δ))Etmst+1 − (it − Etπt+1 − ρ)} (20)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κl mct, (21)
9where ∆ is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator and ηl and κl are parameters which are
computed numerically. Moreover, MSt ≡
R 1
0 MSt (i)di denotes the average time
t real marginal savings in labor costs and MCt ≡
R 1
0 MCt (i)di is average real
marginal cost as of that period.6
Aggregating and log-linearizing the production functions of individual ﬁrms (9)
results in:
yt = αkt +( 1− α)nt, (22)
where Yt ≡ Kα
t N
1−α
t is aggregate production, up to the ﬁrst order.
2.4.3 Market clearing
Aggregating and log-linearizing the goods market clearing condition for each variety
(17), and invoking (9) and (11), we obtain:
yt = ζct +
1 − ζ
δ
[kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt], (23)
where ζ ≡ 1 − δα
µ(ρ+δ) denotes the steady state consumption to output ratio, and
(1−ζ)
δ is the steady state capital to output ratio.
2.5 The Convex Capital Adjustment Cost Case
In what follows, we consider a benchmark model featuring a convex capital adjust-
ment cost at the ﬁrm level, as proposed by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). He assumes







6For a detailed derivation of last the two equations in the text, see the Appendix.
10where It (i) denotes the amount of the composite good which needs to be purchased
by ﬁrm i at time t in order to change its capital stock form Kt (i) to Kt+1 (i) in the
next period. Moreover, function I(·) is assumed to satisfy the following: I(1) = δ,
I0(1) = 1,a n dI00(1) = ηc. Parameter ηc > 0 measures the convex capital adjustment
cost in a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics.
We ﬁnd that the linearized equilibrium conditions implied by the benchmark
model are identical to the ones associated with the lumpy investment model, except
for the inﬂation equation and the law of motion of capital. The latter two equations
take the following form:
∆kt+1 = βEt∆kt+2 +
1
ηc
{(1 − β (1 − δ))Etmst+1 − (it − Etπt+1 − ρ)} (25)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κc mct, (26)
where κc is to be computed numerically.7
A comparison of the last two equations with their counterparts (20) and (21) in
the lumpy investment model reveals that a model featuring a convex capital adjust-
ment cost at the ﬁrm level is equivalent to our speciﬁcation with lumpy investment:
for any given value of the lumpiness parameter, θk, there exists a value of the convex
adjustment parameter, ηc, such that the two laws of motion of capital implied by the
two models are identical. Moreover, the two associated inﬂation equations coincide
for this choice of ηc. This makes it possible to compare our model with the convex
capital adjustment cost benchmark case in a particularly clean way. We turn to this
next.
7For a detailed derivation of the last two equations in the text see, e.g., Woodford (2004).
113 Simulation Results
3.1 Calibration
The period length is one quarter. Table 1 shows the baseline calibration for the
lumpy investment model.
Table 1: Baseline Calibration
σε α β φθ p θk
2 11 0.36 0.99 1 0.75 0.915
The values assigned to parameters σ, ε, α, β, φ,a n dθp are standard.8 The
baseline value of the lumpiness parameter, θk,i s0.915. This appears to be in line
with the micro evidence on plant-level investment reported by Doms and Dunne
(1998). They use U.S. data on 13,700 manufacturing plants over the 17 year period
1972 to 1988. For each plant they establish a rank distribution of capital growth
rates and compute the associated mean and median over all ﬁrms for each rank.
They ﬁnd that “many plants experience a few periods of intense capital growth and
many periods of relatively small capital adjustment: of the 16 capital growth rate
ranks, 12 possess means or medians between -10 and +10%”. Moreover they report
that plants choose on average every second year to change their capital holdings by
at least 5%. We therefore take θk ∈ (0.89,0.94) to be an empirically plausible range
for the lumpiness parameter since values in this interval imply that ﬁrms invest on
average about every 2 to 4 years. This means that we interpret the “relatively small
capital adjustment” as variation in maintenance.9 Our choice of the baseline value
for the lumpiness parameter is simply the midpoint of the interval.
8See, e.g., Sveen and Weinke (2005) and the references herein.
9Variation in maintenance could be entertained in our theoretical model by allowing the depre-
ciation rate to be stochastic.
123.2 Results
Can lumpiness in ﬁrm-level investment be reconciled, under empirically plausible
assumptions, with the degree of smoothness in aggregate capital accumulation which
is needed to render NK models capable of explaining the dynamic eﬀects of monetary
policy shocks? Our answer is yes. A value of about 3 for parameter ηl is needed
in order to account for the smooth response of aggregate demand in response to
monetary policy shocks, as Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) argues in the context of a model
featuring a convex capital adjustment cost at the ﬁrm level. Given the equivalence
between his model and our speciﬁcation with lumpy ﬁrm-level investment we can
ask what is the corresponding value of the lumpiness parameter needed to entertain
this level of aggregate smoothness in capital accumulation and whether or not this
value falls in the interval that we consider to be empirically plausible. We show the
result in Figure 1: Woodford’s preferred calibration of the smoothness in aggregate
capital accumulation falls well in the empirically plausible range. Speciﬁcally, ηl =3
is associated with θk =0 .924 if the remaining parameters are held constant at their
baseline values.
This result is in stark contrast with the predictions of a real business cycle (RBC)
model. In the latter case the implied equilibrium dynamics with lumpy investment
are strikingly similar to the ones associated with a speciﬁcation where investment
at the ﬁrm level is frictionless, as shown in Thomas (2002). What is the economic
reason for this diﬀerence between RBC and NK theory? Our answer is that price
stickiness and market power of ﬁrms, two features that are absent in a RBC model,
aﬀect the smoothness of aggregate capital accumulation with lumpy ﬁrm-level invest-
ment. The intuition is as follows. With lumpy investment the dynamics of aggregate
capital accumulation are driven by the decisions of only a fraction of ﬁrms.10 These
ﬁrms internalize the consequences of their investment decisions for their future ex-
10This is the crucial diﬀerence with respect to the convex adjustment cost case where it is
assumed that all ﬁrms can choose to adjust their capital holdings at each point in time.












Figure 1: Firm-level lumpiness and aggregate smoothness in capital accumulation.
pected marginal savings. In particular, the currently investing ﬁrms foresee that an
increase in the economy’s capital stock (resulting from their investment decisions)
is associated with a decrease in their expected future marginal savings. This means
that in response to an increase in the economywide average marginal savings the
currently investing ﬁrms will choose to limit the size of their investment if the as-
sociated decrease in their own marginal savings is large.11 The extent to which the
marginal savings in the group of currently investing ﬁrms decrease if the capital
stock is increased depends in turn on the price setting behavior. The latter is af-
fected by the price stickiness and market power of ﬁrms in the economy. We turn to
this next. First, we analyze the role of price stickiness if the remaining parameters
are held constant at their baseline values. The results are shown in Figure 2.
11The intuition is similar to the one developed by Sbordorne (2002) and Galí et al. (2001) in
order to explain the diﬀerence in price setting behavior under constant and decreasing returns to
scale.













Figure 2: Price stickiness and aggregate smoothness in capital accumulation.
A decrease in the value assigned to parameter θp results in a decrease of smooth-
ness in aggregate capital accumulation, as measured by the associated change in
the value of parameter ηl. The intuition is simple. With more ﬂexible prices the
ﬁrms currently choosing to increase their capital holdings are more likely to be able
to create additional demand (by decreasing their prices) over the expected lifetimes
of their chosen capital stocks. This increases their marginal returns to capital and
hence the investing ﬁrms are more willing to invest in response to an increase in the
average marginal savings. Second, we analyze the role of monopolistic competition
under the assumption of perfectly ﬂexible prices. Again, all the remaining parame-
ters are held constant at their baseline values. The results are shown in Figure 3.








Figure 3: Market power and aggregate smoothness in capital accumulation.
An increase in the value assigned to parameter ε, which is inversely related to
the market power of ﬁrms, is associated with a decrease in parameter ηl.I n a
more competitive economy a price change has a larger impact on a ﬁrm’s demand.
Therefore the investing ﬁrms can take better advantage of the additional productive
capacity. This makes them less reluctant to change their capital stocks in response
to an increase in the average marginal savings.
Finally, we turn oﬀ the features of price stickiness and monopolistic competition
in our model and compare the results with those obtained in Thomas (2002). In
the absence of price stickiness and monopolistic competition the linearized equilib-
rium dynamics of our lumpy investment economy are exactly identical to the ones
implied by frictionless investment. This can be seen by inspecting the reduced form
16parameter ηl in the ﬂexible price case. It is given by:
ηl =
θk
(1 − θk)(1− βθk)
1 − β (1 − δ)
1 − α + εα
Our model therefore implies results in the spirit of Thomas (2002), if the New-
Keynesian features are turned oﬀ.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Viewed through the lens of a RBC model ﬁrm-level lumpy investment appears to be
irrelevant for business cycle dynamics: the implied equilibrium dynamics are almost
identical to the ones associated with the alternative assumption of frictionless ﬁrm-
level investment. This has been shown in Thomas (2002). However, in the NK liter-
ature it is typically assumed that aggregate capital accumulation is smoother than
it would be if investment at the ﬁrm level were frictionless. Woodford (2003, Ch. 5)
argues that this assumption is crucial for otherwise NK models could not account
for the dynamic eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. Can the required smoothness of
aggregate capital accumulation be rationalized under the empirically plausible as-
sumption of lumpy ﬁrm-level investment? Our answer is yes. In fact, our NK model
with lumpy investment is equivalent to its counterpart featuring a convex capital
adjustment cost at the ﬁrm level. Importantly, the lumpy investment model implies
that empirically plausible parameter values result in aggregate smoothness of capital
accumulation of the kind that is needed to render NK models capable of explaining
the dynamic eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. Moreover, for any given parame-
trization of lumpiness, the resulting smoothness in aggregate capital accumulation
increases with the degrees of price stickiness and monopolistic competition. We use
our model to explain why and how price stickiness and market power of ﬁrms aﬀect
the aggregate smoothness of capital accumulation.
17References
Altig, David, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Jesper Lindé (2005):
Firm-Speciﬁc Capital, Nominal Rigidities, and the Business Cycle, NBER Working
Paper No. 11034.
Caballero, Ricardo J. (1999): Aggregate Investment, In: Handbook of Macroeco-
nomics, Volume 1B, chapter 12, Eds: John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford.
Caballero, Ricardo J., Eduardo M. R. A. Engle (1999): Explaining Investment Dy-
namics in U.S. Manufacturing: A Generalized (S,s) Approach, Econometrica,6 7 ( 4 ) ,
783-826.
Calvo, Guillermo (1983): Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework,
Journal of Monetary Economics,1 2 ( 3 ) ,3 8 3 - 3 9 8 .
Casares, Miguel, and Bennett T. McCallum (2000): An Optimizing IS-LM Frame-
work with Endogenous Investment, NBER Working Paper 7908.
Christiano, Lawrence J. (2004): Firm-Speciﬁc Capital and Aggregate Inﬂation Dy-
namics in Woodford’s Model, mimeo, Northwestern University.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin S. Eichenbaum, Charles Evans (2005): Nominal
Rigidities and the Dynamic Eﬀects of a Shock to Monetary Policy, Journal of Po-
litical Economy 113(1), 1—45.
Doms, Mark, and Timothy Dunne (1998): Capital Adjustment Patterns in Manu-
facturing Plants, Review of Economic Dynamics 1(2), 409-429.
Galí, Jordi, Mark Gertler, and David López-Salido (2001), European Inﬂation Dy-
namics, European Economic Review 45(7), 1237-1270.
Khan, Aubhik, and Julia K. Thomas (2005): Idiosyncratic Shocks and the Role of
Nonconvexities in Plant and Aggregate Investment Dynamics, mimeo.
18Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore (1997): Credit Cycles, Journal of Political
Economy 105(2), 211-248.
Sbordone, Argia M. (2002), Prices and Unit Labor Costs: A New Test of Price
Stickiness, Journal of Monetary Economics 49(2), 265-292.
Smets, Frank, and Raf Wouters (2003): An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area, Journal of the European Economic Association
1(5), 1123—1175.
Sveen, Tommy, and Lutz Weinke (2004): Pitfalls in the Modeling of Forward-
Looking Price Setting and Investment Decisions, Norges Bank Working Paper No.
2004/1.
Sveen, Tommy, and Lutz Weinke (2005): New Perspectives on Capital, Sticky Prices,
and the Taylor Principle, Journal of Economic Theory 123(1), 21—39.
Thomas, Julia K. (2002): Is Lumpy Investment Relevant for the Business Cycle?,
Journal of Political Economy 110(3), 508-534.
Veracierto, Marcelo L. (2002): Plant-Level Irreversible Investment and Equilibrium
Business Cycles, American Economic Review 92(1), 181-197.
Woodford, Michael (2003): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Mone-
tary Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Woodford, Michael (2004): Inﬂation and Output Dynamics with Firm-SpeciﬁcC a p -
ital, mimeo, Princeton University.
Woodford, Michael (2005): Firm-Speciﬁc Capital and the New-Keynesian Phillips
Curve, forthcoming International Journal of Central Banking.
19Appendix: Inﬂation and Capital Dynamics with
Lumpy Investment
In order to ﬁnd the inﬂation equation and the law of motion of the aggregate
capital stock for our lumpy investment model we follow Woodford (2004) and apply
the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. First, we combine (12) with (13) and (14)








(1 − βθp)(1− α)





























(1 − α)(1− βθk)




j Et {it+j − πt+j+1 − ρ}, (A2)
where b Pt (i) ≡
Pt(i)
Pt and b Kt (i) ≡
Kt(i)
Kt denote, respectively, ﬁrm i’s relative price and




















t+1 − τ2b pt (i), (A4)
where τ1 and τ2 are unknown parameters and b p∗
t and b k∗
t+1 denote, respectively, the
average newly set price and the average newly chosen capital stock. Third, we invoke
the Calvo assumption for the price setting lottery and combine it with the deﬁnition







Fourth, we invoke the Calvo assumption for the investment lottery and combine it
with the deﬁnition of aggregate capital, which allows us to write:






Therefore, we ﬁnd: ⎡


















−(1 − θk)τ2 θk
⎤
⎦,
and stability requires that both roots of A are inside the unit circle. Next, we
determine the remaining conditions for the unknown coeﬃcients.
Law of motion of aggregate capital
We use the price-setting rule (A3) to substitute for the inﬁnite sum
P∞
j=0 (βθk)
j Etb pt+j+1 (i)

















(1 − α)(1− βθk)




j Et (it+j − πt+j+1 − ρ), (A7)
where ψ ≡ 1 −
τ1(1−θp)ε
(1−βθpθk). Averaging the last equation over all investing ﬁrms and
21subtracting the resulting equation from (A7) we can write b k∗
t+1 (i) as a function of
b k∗
t+1 and b pt (i), as in the investment rule (A4). This allows us to impose the following
restriction on parameter τ2:
τ2 =
θp (1 − βθk)ε
1 − βθpθk − τ1 (1 − θp)ε
. (A8)
In order to derive the law of motion of capital, we aggregate (A7) over all in-
vesting ﬁrms and use (A6). This way we obtain:
∆kt+1 = βEt∆kt+2 +
1
ηl











We derive the inﬂation equation in an analog manner. Combining the log-









(1 − βθp)(1− α)







1 − α + εα
1
1 − βθpθk
b kt (i), (A10)
where φ ≡ 1 −
α(1−θk)βθpτ2
(1−α+εα)(1−βθpθk). Next, we average the last equation over all price
setters and subtract the resulting equation from (A10). After invoking the price-
setting rule (A3) we can impose the following restriction on parameter τ1:
τ1 =
(1 − βθp)α
(1 − α + εα)(1− βθpθk) − α(1 − θk)βθpτ2
. (A11)
Equations (A8) and (A11), when combined with the two stability conditions, de-
22termine the two unknown parameters τ1 and τ2 Last, we use (A5) and derive the
inﬂation equation by averaging (A10) over price-setters. This results in:
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